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Abstract: Local taxation produces consequential resource inequalities among public school districts,
but little is known about how policy design affects taxpayers’ willingness to pay for schooling. We
show that voters are more likely to approve local school taxes if the policy is written to require
citizen–state consultation on how the funds are spent. In a sample of 236 California school district
elections, the promise of indirect consultation with a citizen advisory board was associated with a
3.7 percentage-point greater share of voters and a probability of passage that was 31 percentage
points greater, whereas direct consultation with voters was associated with a 5.7 percentage-point
greater share of voters and a probability of passage that was 32 percentage points greater, relative
to a proposed tax increase with no consultation. These results provide evidence that citizens may
trade increased taxation for increased voice even within an established democracy.
Keywords: taxation; fiscal sociology; democracy; school finance
ARE citizens willing to pay more for public schools in exchange for a greatervoice in how the money is spent? Recent studies by economists and sociol-
ogists conclude that resource differences among public school districts can yield
unequal learning outcomes (Jackson, Johnson, and Persico 2016; Lafortune, Roth-
stein, and Schanzenbach 2018; Owens 2018). Most of the resources available to
public schools come from taxation, but sociologists still know relatively little about
which institutional designs may make taxpayers more or less willing to pay for pub-
lic schools. We test a hypothesis derived from political sociology: that the public’s
willingness to pay for public schools depends, in part, on whether school taxes are
coupled with institutional arrangements for citizen voice. Political sociologists have
long argued that citizens may demand to be consulted as the price of their acquies-
cence to taxation (Schumpeter [1918] 1991; Tilly 2009). This argument was first used
to explain the emergence of aristocratic parliaments in early-modern Europe. It was
subsequently generalized into a “fiscal theory of democracy” (Ross 2012) that was
applied to explain the spread of such modern democratic institutions as competitive
elections and equal suffrage. We propose, and test, a further generalization: Even
within an established democracy, voters may be most amenable to increased taxes if
the demand for revenue is accompanied by procedural concessions. In particular,
voters may be most likely to concede additional resources if officials commit to
consult with citizens on how those resources are spent.
We test this hypothesis with a new database of school district parcel tax pro-
posals presented to California voters over the period from 1997 through 2010. Our
sample includes local elections in which voters in a given school district were asked
explicitly to affirm their willingness to be taxed at a given rate. Within this sample,
the structure of the proposed tax (a levy on owners of real estate, assessed at a fixed
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dollar amount per parcel) and its general purpose (spending on public schools) are
held constant. The proposals varied, however, in whether and how they coupled
the tax with institutional mechanisms for consultation. Almost half of the proposals
we analyze (43 percent) paired a tax increase with a promise of what we describe
as indirect consultation in the form of a citizens’ oversight committee charged with
reviewing how the revenues were spent. Proposals also varied in whether, and with
what frequency, they promised what we describe as direct consultation in the form
of a commitment to return to the voters for reauthorization. We characterize such
procedural arrangements with Tilly’s (2009:181) concept of “citizen–state consul-
tation,” in preference to the terms “democracy” or “representation,” because we
do not wish to prejudge whether, as a matter of normative political theory, these
forms of consultation should be regarded as truly democratic or representative. Our
purpose in this article is to assess whether citizens do, in fact, trade increased taxes
for increased consultation rather than to assess the quality of that consultation.
We fit fixed effects and correlated random effects regression models to identify
the average within-district differences in the percentage of voters who supported
tax proposals depending on whether those proposals institutionalized either form
of consultation. We find evidence that voters in the same school district were more
likely to accept increased taxation if it was coupled with consultation. When a tax
increase was coupled with indirect consultation, an additional 3.7 percent of voters
were expected to approve it compared with a similar measure in the same school
district without any promise of consultation. When a tax increase was coupled with
direct consultation, an additional 5.7 percent of voters were expected to approve
it relative to a tax increase without a promise of consultation. These differences
may appear modest, but they were often sufficient to swing close elections. We
find that a measure with either form of consultation was more likely to pass than a
comparable measure, proposed to voters of the same district, that did not include
any promise of consultation, and the difference in the likelihood of passage could
be 30 percentage points or more.
This study provides new evidence that taxpayers’ support for public schooling
may vary with institutional design for state–citizen consultation. It also provides
new observational evidence of a behavioral mechanism—an explicit exchange of
increased taxation for increased voice—that has been assumed, but rarely measured,
in the political sociology of democratization. These findings are consistent with the
hypothesis that voters demand accountability in exchange for taxes but that a variety
of different institutional designs may satisfy citizen demands for accountability—
and therefore that the fiscal theory of democratization may have more general
application than has been appreciated.
Taxation and Consultation
An influential argument in political sociology holds that state officials’ demands
for increased taxation typically produce public demands for accountability. As
Tilly (2009) glossed the argument, a state that would extract resources from its
subjects must bargain for the consent of those subjects; as early-modern rulers
approached their subjects for resources with increasing frequency, such bargaining
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came to be routinized, and the resulting processes of consultation yielded many of
the institutional innovations that we now associate with representative democracy.
Schumpeter (1991 [1918]), in his classic essay on “fiscal sociology,” offered a version
of this argument to account for the convening of the estates by the Habsburg
monarchy; Tilly (2009:179) asserted that the same theory could account for “most
of the world’s democratization over the last 200 years,” and its influence has been
such that Paler (2013:706), writing in the American Journal of Political Science, called
it “almost a truism in political science” that citizens bargain for representation as
the price of their consent to be taxed.
But should citizens in an established democracy be expected to demand in-
creased consultation in exchange for increased taxes? Prior studies are inconclusive.
The fiscal theory of democratization is associated with a very general argument
that taxation increases “citizen motivation to hold government accountable” (Paler
2013:707), but abstract statements of the theory provide little guidance about pre-
cisely how much consultation should be expected to satisfy demands for account-
ability. Scholars have typically tested the theory with data on the emergence of
the first representative institutions in previously authoritarian settings (Ross 2004;
Boucoyannis 2015; Møller 2017). Such studies provide evidence that taxation can
lead to effective demands for at least some minimal degree of electoral representa-
tion, but they do little to clarify whether or how state officials’ subsequent demands
for increased taxation might relate to citizens’ demands for increased consultation
above the barest minimum. Although the fiscal theory of democratization also has
been invoked to explain the emergence of such varied political institutions as aris-
tocratic parliaments, municipal corporatism (Bates and Lien 1985), equal suffrage,
and the popular referendum, among others (Martin 2015), abstract statements of the
theory are often vague with respect to precisely which institutional arrangements
satisfy citizen demands for accountability.
The hypothesized bargain—in which taxpayers acquiesce to increased taxation
in exchange for institutionalized consultation—is also difficult to measure because
consent to taxation is difficult to observe directly. In rare historical upheavals, revo-
lutionaries may assert that “taxation without representation is tyranny” or write
new constitutions that explicitly balance the power to tax with rights of representa-
tion. But events such as the American Revolution, in which republicans explicitly
contest the power to tax and design new governmental institutions, are uncommon.
Scholars who have attempted to test the fiscal theory of democratization with a
sufficient sample size for statistical inference have been forced to infer the existence
of the hypothesized bargain indirectly from cross-national correlations between
aggregate tax revenues and aggregate indices of democracy (Ross 2004; Baskaran
and Bigsten 2013; Gur 2014), which provide little insight into which particular
policy decisions may have been traded for which institutional arrangements. Other
scholars have used survey instruments or experimental games to understand the
presumptive taxation-for-accountability bargain, but the relevance of such stud-
ies to behavior outside of the experimental setting is unknown (Paler 2013). The
literature contains few examples in which a taxation-for-accountability bargain is
struck explicitly, with the result being that some scholars doubt that “bargaining”
describes the relevant historical process at all (Boucoyannis 2015).
sociological science | www.sociologicalscience.com 655 October 2018 | Volume 5
Martin and Nations Taxation and Citizen Voice
We overcome this problem with a study of 236 local elections in which voters
were asked explicitly to affirm their willingness to be taxed at a given rate. Our
sample of tax proposals is limited to parcel tax measures put before voters by
California school districts. Within this sample, the structure of the tax and its
general purpose are held constant. The proposals varied, however, in whether and
how they would institutionalize future consultation over the use of tax revenues.
California’s tax regime provides an especially rich context for studying the fiscal
bargaining process between public officials and citizens. A 1978 amendment to the
state constitution (Proposition 13) required all local tax increases to be submitted to
the voters for approval, and—as subsequently interpreted by the courts—required
a two-thirds majority of the voters of a school district to approve any local tax
earmarked for public schools. Subsequent developments in state law, culminating in
a 1996 constitutional amendment (Proposition 218), standardized the requirements
for such elections and foreclosed many alternative revenue strategies for public
schools. This legal framework effectively left the state’s local school boards with one
way to increase taxes: asking the voters to approve a parcel tax, which is a lump-sum
tax per parcel of real property (in contrast to a property tax, which is levied on the
value of real property). School district parcel tax measures often enumerate specific
purposes for which revenues will be spent and specify institutional mechanisms
for consultation with citizens to ensure that the revenues are spent as promised.
The state averages more than 20 such measures per year. The record of parcel tax
elections since 1997 therefore provides an ample documentary record of how voters
responded to proposals that explicitly coupled increased taxation and increased
consultation.
We hypothesize that both direct and indirect consultation will be associated
with greater support for a tax increase net of other considerations, including the
size of the tax, the demographics of the district’s student population, and the
district’s budget. Other things being equal, tax measures that promise any form of
consultation will be approved by a greater share of voters, and will be more likely
to pass, than tax measures that do not.
Data and Method
We rely on a new data set of school district parcel tax measures that includes nearly
every parcel tax proposed to residents in any California school district. For the
present analysis, we limit the sample to years between 1997 and 2010 because the
legal regime governing this type of tax was homogenous during this period. The
California Elections Data Archive (CEDA) and the California Debt and Investment
Advisory Commission (CDIAC) published lists of measures and election results,
which we used to identify school districts for which parcel taxes appeared on the
ballot and districts where they were approved by voters. We excluded school bond
measures, which are regulated differently from other tax measures and involve
calculations of future debt obligations that may elicit different voter behavior. A
team of research assistants collected local government documents describing these
parcel tax measures, including sample ballots, voter information guides, and school
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district resolutions. The archive containing these primary source documents is
available online (Martin, Lopez, and Olsen 2017).
Coding the measures was a deductive exercise. We drew on prior research
in fiscal sociology and behavioral public finance to identify potentially salient
dimensions of tax policy that might influence voter behavior. Research assistants
coded measures for information about the magnitude of the tax, exemptions, sunset
provisions, and citizen oversight provisions.
The analyses reported below include 236 parcel tax measures in 83 separate
districts. The measures include proposals to enact a new parcel tax, increase the
rate of parcel taxation, and authorize the continuation of a previously enacted
parcel tax. In order to construct a meaningful within-district estimator, we limit the
sample to those districts that considered parcel taxes more than once. Because of
this limitation, our sample of 83 districts represents a small fraction of California’s
more than 900 public school districts. The districts in the resulting sample had,
on average, less intergovernmental revenue per capita than the average California
school district and greater annual budget shortfalls, both of which are consistent
with the assumption that officials in these school districts may have been especially
motivated to propose local tax increases. The districts in our sample also had fewer
Hispanic students than the average California school district, which is consistent
with the assumption that their voters might have been especially willing to support
increased public spending on schools; sociologists have found that voters in at least
some majority-white jurisdictions are less willing to support tax increases when
they believe the results will be spent to benefit Latino residents (O’Brien 2017). In
other respects, the sample appears unremarkable. The ballot measures included in
our sample received 70 percent of the vote, on average, and were approved about
67 percent of the time. More descriptive information about the characteristics of
this sample in comparison with the population of California school districts can be
found in the online supplement.
We fit linear models that relate the share of voters who approve a tax (Y) to a
vector of policy design features (X) and contextual features of the school district (Z).
Policy features that affect the share of affirmative votes on average, however, may
differ from those that most affect the likelihood that a policy will pass: The two-
thirds supermajority requirement to enact a school district parcel tax means that
the pivotal voter who casts the decisive vote may be different from, and more tax
averse than, the median voter. For this reason, we also fit linear probability models
in which the dependent variable Y is a dichotomy equal to one if the proposed
measure passed and equal to zero if it failed. The latter strategy may be understood
to model which policy design features were particularly associated with the support
of the pivotal voter at the two-thirds threshold required for passage.
Our focal independent variables in X include measures of indirect and direct
consultation. To capture indirect consultation, we coded each proposed measure
for whether the ballot question made explicit provision for a citizen committee
specifically charged with oversight of the expenditure of funds from the tax. Coders
were instructed as follows: “Some measures include the mandatory establishment
of a citizen oversight committee to supervise the expenditure of funds collected
through the tax. Does this measure include a provision to create a citizen oversight
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committee?” The coding of this variable may be illustrated by comparing two ballot
questions put before the voters of the Santee Unified School District in San Diego:
Measure J (March 2, 2004) and Measure Y (November 2, 2004). The text of both
ballot questions was substantially identical but for the additions, italicized below,
that appeared only in Measure Y:
...shall Santee School District be authorized to levy and collect an annual
special assessment for five years only, beginning July 1, [year], at the
rate of $60 per year for each residential parcel within the school district
and $400 per year for each commercial, industrial, or nonresidential
use parcel within the School District with an exemption for any parcel
whose beneficial owner has attained the age of 65 on or before July 1
of any assessment year and who uses that parcel as his or her principal
place of residence, with no proceeds going to the state or administrator
salaries, with all funds staying in Santee to benefit local schools, with
annual oversight of funds by a citizens’ committee and annual audits, and
shall the Santee School District implement accountability measures in
connection with the special assessment?
We coded Measure Y as requiring a citizens’ oversight committee and Measure J as
requiring none.
To measure the frequency of direct consultation, coders were instructed to record
whether voter approval of a proposed tax increase was scheduled to expire (or
“sunset”) after a specified period of time and, if so, to record the number of years
from the election until the scheduled date of expiry. A tax increase that sunsets
requires voters’ reauthorization. For the purposes of this analysis, we created a
binary variable equal to one if the proposed tax was scheduled to expire in five years
or sooner and another binary variable equal to one if a proposed tax measure was
scheduled to expire after a period of six years or longer. A proposed tax increase
that is scheduled to sunset within five years is assumed to imply more frequent
direct consultation.
We control for three additional features of the policy proposal that may have
bearing on voters’ willingness to approve it. First, we control for the proposed rate
of tax expressed in the natural logarithm of dollars per residential parcel. Assuming
the median voter to be a homeowner who does not own a business or a second
home, this is the tax increase faced by the median voter. We hypothesize that
voters were more likely to reject more expensive taxes. Second, we control for
whether the proposed parcel tax includes an exemption for the elderly. Some previous
research on public support for school finance indicates that elderly voters, who
typically do not have school-age children and who may be especially concerned
about the effects of a parcel tax on their fixed incomes, may be more likely to oppose
school tax increases (Tedin, Matland, and Weiher 2001; Plutzer and Berkman 2005).
Perhaps for this reason, 86 percent of the parcel tax proposals in our sample were
drafted specifically to exempt elderly people or elderly homeowners in particular.
We control for a dichotomous measure of the presence of any policy language
exempting elderly people or elderly homeowners because we hypothesize that it
might correlate with voters’ support for the measures. Third, we control for the
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timing of the tax increase in relation to the election. Previous research has shown
that voters may be substantially more likely to approve of a tax increase if they are
consulted after implementation than if they are consulted beforehand (Pearson 2014;
Martin, Lopez, and Olson 2018). We anticipate a similar finding for district parcel
taxes: Proposals to continue a previously implemented tax increase are expected to
win greater approval than proposals to implement a tax increase in the future.
Our models also adjust for several contextual factors that could account for
voters’ support for local school funding. We control for the percentages of enrolled
students in the district who were identified as black and Hispanic, respectively, in
annual reports to the California Department of Education. We also control for the
natural logarithm of the school district’s intergovernmental revenue per capita as a
proxy for the availability of other school district revenues. This measure comes from
the quinquennial Census of Governments and is imputed linearly to intercensal
years. Finally, we include a measure of the homeownership rate, or the proportion of
district-resident households that were owner occupied, computed from decennial
census data and linearly imputed to intercensal years. There is some evidence that
homeowners may be particularly averse to property taxes (Ladd and Wilson 1983;
Sears and Citrin 1985), and we might expect them to be more likely to vote against
parcel taxes.
The principle threat to the validity of our inferences is the possibility that both
the design of a policy and the decision to place it on the ballot may be endogenous
to voters’ likelihood of approving it. The decision to place a parcel tax measure on
the ballot is not random. It is likely that school district officials who wish to raise
revenues may anticipate the outcome before they go to the trouble and expense
of calling an election on a particular proposal. The existence of an industry of
consultants who conduct polls on the wording of ballot questions in order to advise
school districts on policy design (Scott 2013) is prima facie evidence that policy
design may be endogenous to the degree of voter support or the likelihood of
passage. Observed differences in support between proposals with and without
provisions for indirect consultation, for example, might simply tell us that school
boards only promised such consultation in cases in which they already knew voters
would support increased school district funding.
Our strategy for addressing the possible bias induced by endogenous sample
selection has two parts. First, we address the possibility that unobserved, time-
constant factors may predispose the school districts in our sample to both put tax
measures on the ballot and approve them. It is reasonable to assume that some
school districts’ voters are simply more likely than other school districts’ voters
to favor increased taxation for schools. We adjust for unobserved, time-invariant
differences among school districts with a correlated random effects (CRE) estimator.
This estimator goes under various names; our choice of terminology is due to
Wooldridge (2002). We fit the following equation to our data, in which subscript i
represents unique districts, t denotes years, and k represents policy proposals:
Ykit = α+ β
′
(Xkit − Xi) + γ′(Zit − Zi) + ξ ′Xi + ζ ′Zi + ηλˆit + δt + εkit.
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Here, Y is the dependent variable: In Model 1, it is the percentage of voters ap-
proving the measure, and in Models 2 and 3, it is a binary indicator equal to one
if the measure passed. The vector β includes the coefficients of the within-district
components of our measures of policy characteristics, including the measures of
consultation that are of focal interest for our analysis. The vector γ includes coeffi-
cients of the within-district components of contextual covariates that describe the
school district, and ξ and ζ represent coefficients of between-district components.
The symbol δ represents a vector of dummy variables for year, and ε is a stochastic
error term. We decompose any district-specific, time-invariant correlates of Y into a
linear combination of district-averaged variables Xi and Zi and a residual that is in-
dependent of X and Z by construction (Mundlak 1978). This permits us to interpret
β as equivalent to a fixed-effects (FE) estimator. Perhaps the most commonly cited
advantage of CRE over the common FE estimator is that CRE allows for explicit
measurement of coefficients of time-invariant characteristics of the observational
units (school districts, in our case; Fairbrother 2014; Bell and Jones 2015). For our
purposes, however, the coefficients ξ and ζ are not of substantive interest, and
it is another advantage of CRE that is more important: It permits adjustments
for time-varying sample selection bias. We compute Zi for all years from 1997 to
2010, including those during which no tax measures were on the ballot, so that we
can interpret β as an estimator that has not been distorted by endogenous sample
selection correlated with Z (Wooldridge 1995; Semykina and Wooldridge 2010).
The second part of our strategy is to treat the decision to place a tax measure
on the ballot as a process to be modeled explicitly. In particular, we include a
predicted nonselection hazard λˆit in our models. This strategy requires us to identify
the population of potential measures and construct a model of the likelihood that
a measure will appear on the ballot (following the well-known Heckman two-
step estimator; see Semykina and Wooldridge 2010 for an introduction to this
approach in the context of CRE models). We assumed that the population of
potential measures was equivalent to the set of actual measures plus one possible
measure for each school-district year during which no measure appeared on the
ballot. We estimated the nonselection hazard λit for each district-year as one minus
the predicted probability computed from a probit model whose dependent variable
was the presence of a tax measure on the ballot. For each year from 1997 to 2010,
we fit a separate cross-sectional probit model to data on our population of potential
measures, including annual observations of 916 California school districts that were
observed for all or part of the period. Each probit model expressed the probability
of observing a ballot measure as a cumulative standard normal function of a vector
of covariates W, defined as a superset of Z that included two additional predictors.
The first additional predictor was the inverse hyperbolic sine of the budget shortfall,
measured as the difference between the total expenditures and total revenues
reported by the district in the Census of Governments. We interpolated intercensal
values linearly. A district experiencing a substantial budget shortfall might be
especially likely to ask the voters to approve a new tax. The second additional
predictor was the annual reported total enrollment in the school district. School
districts with more students might be expected to face more resource demands
and therefore be more likely to propose a tax increase. We decomposed W into
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longitudinal and cross-sectional components so that our model of the nonselection
hazard is represented as follows:
P(Ykitobserved|Wit) = 1− λit = Φ(κt + ν′t(Wit −Wi) + υ
′
tWi),
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function, κ is a constant,
and υ and ν are vectors of coefficients for the cross-sectional and longitudinal
components of W, respectively. Repeated cross-sectional estimation, instead of
pooled cross-section time series, permits the coefficients in ν to vary by year and
permits asymptotically unbiased parameter estimation (Semykina and Wooldridge
2010). The McKelvey and Zavoina pseudo-R2 statistics for the probit selection
equations varied from 41 percent to 90 percent with an average of 61 percent.
The model coefficients are summarized in the online supplement. We use these
regression equations to compute a predicted value of λit for each observed measure;
we represent this predicted value as λˆit.
Our two-step estimator (by means of which we estimate λit first, and only then
β) will yield asymptotically unbiased estimates of β on the strong assumption that
we have modeled sample selection correctly. In a finite sample, in which the true
selection process is not known with certainty, as Stolzenberg and Relles (1990) have
shown, explicit estimators of sample selection such as this one sometimes perform
poorly. We therefore also report coefficient estimates from FE models without any
explicit model of the nonselection hazard. These models have the following form:




Zit + δt +ωi + εkit.
In this equation, subscript i represents unique districts, t denotes years, and k repre-
sents policy proposals. The dependent variable (the percentage of voters approving
a measure, or a dichotomous indicator of passage, respectively) is represented by
Y. The vector β includes the variables of interest in our model, or the coefficients
of the within-district components. The γ vector includes the coefficients of con-
textual variables. The term δ represents a vector of dummy variables for year, ω
represents a vector of implicit district-specific intercepts assumed to be fixed, and
ε is a stochastic error term. The FE models do not require the assumption that we
have modeled the sample selection process correctly, but they impose the different,
and arguably equally strong, assumption that the sample selection is ignorable.
In the following section, we report coefficients from both CRE and FE mod-
els. The estimators produce nearly identical coefficients for the focal variables,
suggesting that our conclusions are robust to this choice of modeling strategy. (In
supplemental models, we also tested a conditional random effects logit specification
for our models of policy passage; our qualitative findings remained unchanged,
and we report coefficients from linear probability models for ease of interpretation.)
Findings
Do promises of future consultation improve the likelihood that voters will approve
of school district tax increases? Below, we present averages for the share of voters
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approving a measure, and the share of measures that passed, by whether or not the
measures included provisions for fiscal consultation.
We begin with indirect consultation measured by the inclusion of a provision
for a citizens’ advisory committee. A simple comparison of averages suggests very
little difference between the share of votes cast for proposals that included, and
those that omitted, indirect consultation. The first column of Table 1 shows that the
average share of yes votes was about 70 percent when measures proposed indirect
consultation and about 70 percent when they did not. The second column shows
that the rate of passage was greater by about 3 percentage points for measures that
included provisions for indirect consultation compared with measures that did not.
This difference is in the hypothesized direction, but it is small, and its magnitude
is exceeded by its standard error. These raw differences are inconclusive; they are
unadjusted for other characteristics of the proposed tax and the district, and they
may confound variation across policy proposals with variation across districts that
have very different propensities to favor increased taxation for schools.
The last two lines of Table 1 present adjusted differences computed from our
within-district estimators. These represent the average differences within the same
district in support for tax proposals with and without a provision for indirect con-
sultation. These differences are adjusted for common temporal variation, other
policy characteristics (including the rate of tax), and contextual characteristics of the
district. Our CRE model, which includes an explicit adjustment for sample selec-
tion, indicates that a proposal that coupled a tax increase with indirect consultation
would be expected to receive a 3.7 percentage point greater share of affirmative
votes compared with another proposed tax increase in the same district that did not
provide for consultation. The FE estimator, which omits explicit sample selection
adjustment, yields a virtually identical estimate of 3.6 percentage points. Both esti-
mates are statistically suggestive (p < 0.05; our terminology here follows Benjamin
et al. 2017).
Even 3.7 percent of voters may be influential if they include the pivotal voter at
the two-thirds threshold required for passage, and the evidence is consistent with
the hypothesis that indirect consultation made a big difference for the probability
that a tax measure would pass. The second column of Table 1 reports our estimates
of the adjusted differences in the probability of passage associated with indirect
consultation. Here, the CRE model implies that if voters of a district were presented
with two otherwise identical parcel tax measures, the one that provided for indirect
consultation would have had a 31 percentage point greater expected probability of
passage. This difference is statistically significant (p < 0.005). School boards may
have been especially likely to promise indirect consultation when there was a high
probability that such a promise would provide the margin of victory.
We turn now to direct consultation as measured by the frequency with which a
school board must return to the voters for approval to continue the proposed tax.
Table 2 reports the mean share of votes for measures depending on the frequency of
direct consultation. As with indirect consultation, the comparison of raw averages
is inconclusive. The average share of voters is similar for measures that do and do
not couple parcel tax increases with consultation and varies little with the frequency
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Table 1: Share of yes votes and passage as a function of indirect consultation in ballot measures for California
school district parcel taxes, 1997–2010.
(1) Vote share (2) Probability of passage
With indirect consultation 69.7 (0.7) 0.68 (0.05)
Without indirect consultation 70.2 (0.7) 0.65 (0.04)
Raw difference –0.4 (1.0) 0.03 (0.06)
Within-district difference
From CRE model with sample selection adjustment 3.7† (1.4) 0.31∗ (0.09)
From FE model 3.6† (1.3) 0.30∗ (0.09)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.005
of consultation. The rate of passage was lowest for measures that required no direct
consultation, though the difference is slight.
The within-district estimators adjust these differences for characteristics of
districts and measures. This adjusted comparison shows that a tax increase that
required voter reauthorization within five years—which we characterize as frequent
direct consultation—was associated with a share of affirmative votes that was almost
6 percentage points greater than a measure with no such sunset provision. The
difference is statistically significant (p < 0.005). Direct consultation, like indirect
consultation, appears to have had a greater effect on the likelihood of passage than
on the share of the voters approving the measure. The CRE model implies that if
voters of a district were presented with two otherwise identical parcel tax increases,
one of which was scheduled to expire within five years unless voters approved
it again and the other of which had no expiration date, the proposal requiring
frequent direct consultation would be 32 percentage points (p < 0.05) more likely
to pass. As might be expected, infrequent consultation was associated with levels
of support between the levels associated with frequent consultation and the levels
associated with no consultation, but these differences are not estimated with much
certainty.
Because our inferences rest on within-district comparisons over time, one possi-
ble threat to our inferences is the possibility that the correlations between forms of
consultation and voter approval are artifacts of temporal sequence. For example, as
we have noted, public officials in the Santee Unified School District first introduced
Measure J in 2004, which did not provide for indirect consultation, and only after it
failed introduced Measure Y, an otherwise identical measure with a provision for
indirect consultation; if voters’ preferences changed during the intervening period
for unrelated reasons—perhaps it simply takes multiple elections for voters to grow
habituated to the idea of raising taxes—then our model specification might lead
us to mistake the mere effect of maturing voter preferences for an effect of policy
design. We inspected the data and found little evidence that policy design varied
systematically with the position of the policy in a sequence. We found that school
districts in our sample became more likely to promise indirect consultation after
their first parcel tax measure, although the difference was not statistically significant
(45 percent of measures that promised indirect consultation, and 52 percent of those
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Table 2: Share of yes votes and passage as a function of direct consultation in ballot measures for California
school district parcel taxes, 1997–2010.
(1) Vote share (2) Probability of passage
Requiring frequent consultation, defined as within 5 years 69.8 (0.8) 0.64 (0.05)
Requiring infrequent consultation, defined as every 6 years or less often 70.1 (0.7) 0.69 (0.04)
Requiring no consultation 69.9 (1.4) 0.63 (0.09)
Raw difference, frequent consultation vs. none –0.1 (1.6) 0.01 (0.10)
Within-district difference, frequent consultation vs. none
From CRE model with sample selection adjustment 5.7∗ (1.7) 0.32† (0.13)
From FE model 5.3∗ (1.7) 0.28† (0.13)
Raw difference, infrequent consultation vs. none 0.3 (1.5) 0.06 (0.10)
Within-district difference, infrequent consultation vs. none
From CRE model with sample selection adjustment 1.5 (1.7) 0.14 (0.12)
From FE model 1.4 (1.6) 0.12 (0.12)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.005
that did not, were the first measures in their respective districts; χ2 = 1.8; 1 degree
of freedom [d.f.]; p = 0.18). We found evidence that districts in our sample were less
likely to promise frequent direct consultation after their first parcel tax measure (59
percent of measures that promised frequent direct consultation, compared with 42
percent of the measures that did not, were the first tax measures in their respective
districts; χ2 = 9.0; 1 d.f.; p < 0.005). We tested whether this temporal sequencing
might affect our inferences by fitting a series of supplemental models equivalent
to the models we report in Tables 1 and 2 but with an additional dummy variable
in vector X that we set equal to one if a measure was the first parcel tax measure
proposed in its respective district and set equal to zero otherwise. The resulting
estimates of the effects of consultation on the affirmative vote share were within 0.3
percentage points, and the estimates of the effects of consultation on the probability
of passage were within 1 percentage point, of the estimates reported in Tables 1
and 2. We report these sensitivity analyses in the online supplement; they left our
quantitative findings almost unchanged from the models reported in Tables 1 and 2.
Regression tables for the analyses reported in Tables 1 and 2, including the
within-district coefficients of other policy design features and contextual variables,
are also reported in the online supplement. For the most part, the coefficients of the
covariates had the hypothesized signs. The within-district R2 statistics were 0.38
for both analyses of the affirmative vote share and 0.28 and 0.29 for the CRE and FE
analyses of measure passage, respectively.
Concluding Discussion
Voters in California school districts were more willing to support increased fund-
ing for public schools when proposed parcel tax increases gave them additional
opportunities to trade taxation for consultation. Our analyses provide evidence
that both direct and indirect forms of consultation coincide with increases in voters’
willingness to approve tax increases. The promise of repeated direct consultation, or
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the future renewal of a tax by popular vote, correlates with a greater share of votes
and a higher probability of passage. Our models suggest that voters responded
positively to promises of citizen oversight boards as well: The probability of pas-
sage and the percentage of affirmative votes were higher when ballots included an
oversight guarantee.
These findings provide evidence that the fiscal theory of democratization may
have application to changing political institutions even within already long-established
democracies. The exchange of consultation for taxation is not limited to protodemo-
cratic parliaments in authoritarian regimes. Nor are taxpayers’ demands for voice
and accountability exhausted by constitutional guarantees of equal suffrage, rep-
resentative legislatures, and the occasional referendum. Even where such institu-
tional guarantees already exist, citizens may want guarantees of more voice in fiscal
decision-making whenever more resources are demanded of them. The present
findings also suggest that citizen demands for consultation may be satisfied by a
variety of institutional forms, ranging from an appointed citizen committee to a
direct plebiscite on fiscal decision-making.
Our findings may be of particular use for public school districts. To be sure,
California’s school finance system is unusual, and our sample is likely to be unrep-
resentative even of all California school districts. It would be a mistake to assume
that every school tax proposal would be 31 percent more likely to become law if
it was coupled with provision for a citizens’ advisory committee. It seems most
plausible to suppose that we observe a difference this large in the present sample
because such provisions were put forward precisely where they would make the
largest difference. But our findings may be taken to support the general conclusion
that measures promising citizen consultation can win the support of some voters
for increased school taxes, particularly voters on the margin, who otherwise might
be reluctant to pay more for public education. When public schools struggle for
resources, it may be useful to consider whether a bargain may be struck that would
trade increased taxation for increased citizen voice.
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